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Haggerty: Fraud on the Market

FRAUD ON THE MARKET: THE
DECLINE OF RELIANCE IN A
lOb-5 ACTION

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Affliliated Ute Citizens v. United States, l there has been considerable variation
among the circuits regarding the requirement of reliance as an
element of an action under rule 10b-5 of the federal securities
regulations. S The differences seem to stem from a disagreement
as to the underlying purposes of the securities regulations. While
the regulations were established to force disclosure of material
investment information and to maintain market stability, they
were also designed to protect the investing public. a In an attempt to reconcile these sometimes disparate purposes, one circuit has designed a theory since labeled "fraud on the market."4
While it does not eliminate the reliance requirement of a lOb-5
action, this theory does substantially lessen the plaintiff's burden of proof. The reaction to this theory has led to further differences of opinion regarding exactly what the role of reliance
should be, and the extent to which reliance must be proven to
make out a prima facie case of securities fraud.'
1. 406 U.S. 128 (1971).
2. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied.
434 U.S. 875 (1977); Chelsea Aasoc's. v. Rapanos, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); Blackie
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Carraa v.
Burns, 516 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1975); Schlick v. Penn· Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374
(2nd Cir. 1974); Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880 (5th
Cir. 1973).
3. Eight policies have been identified aa the underlying goala of rule 10b·5, (17
C.F.R. § 240.10b·5 (1981». They are: "(1) maintaining free securities markets; (2) equal·
izing accesa to information; (3) inauring equal bargaining strength; (4) providing for dis·
closure; (5) protecting investors; (6) assuring fairne88; (7) building investor confidence;
and (8) detening violationa while compensating victims." 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT or
RULE 10b·5, at § 6 (1980).
4. Blackie v. Banack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
6. See panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2nd Cir. 1981); Shores v. Sklar. 647 F.2d 462

407

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 3

408

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:407

II. BACKGROUND
The Securities Act of 19336 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934' (hereinafter "Acts" or "Securities Acts") were enacted
to protect investors from the many abuses which led to the stock
market crash of 1929.8 Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under section 10-b of the Securities Exchange Act as a provision designed
to protect investors from manipulative and deceptive practices
in connection with the sale or purchase of securities.s
Rule 10b-5 is grounded in the common law tort of deceit. tO
Dean Prosser lists the traditional elements of deceit as:
(1) a false representation made by the defendant;

(2) knowledge or belief by the defendant that the
representation is false; (3) defendant's intent to
induce plaintiff to act or refrain from acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation; (4) justifiable
reliance on the part of the plaintiff in acting or
refraining from acting; and (5) actual damage to
the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.ll

The federal courts, attempting to compensate parties injured by
(5th Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3377 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1981) (No. 81839); Vervaecke v. Chiles, Heider & Co., 578 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1978).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1976).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b to 77e, 77j, 77m, 770, 77s, 78& to 78d, 78e to 78k-l, 781, 78m to
780,780-3,780-4, 78p to 78q-7, 78r to 78dd-2, 77ee to 78hh, 78ii, 78jj, 78kk (1976).
8. See Note, Municipal Bonds: Is There a Need for Mandatory Disclosure?, 58 J.
URB. L. 255, 260 (1981).
9. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and is set out in 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981). It
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or &ale of any
security.
10. Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5, 88
HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975). [hereinafter cited as The Reliance Requirement).
11. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 105, at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971).
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fraudulent securities transactions, have used deceit as merely a
starting point for a 10b-5 action in order to develop a federal
common law that "will promote the broad policy goals of 10b5."12
The Supreme Court, however, has reversed an earlier trend
of expanding liability under 10b-5, beginning with its 1975 decision in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,18 and most
recently in the holding in Chiarella v. United States. It The
Court has moved toward a more stringent common law approach, requiring proof of the traditional elements of fraud and
deceit in any 10b-5 action!!!
While the Supreme Court's trend appears to be one of contraction of liability, the circuit courts still follow the expansive
precedent established by Affiliated Ute: When the defendant
has not disclosed relevant information, a plaintiff is allowed to
establish the reliance necessary to prove fraud through the use
of a rebuttable presumption;18 where there is an omission, the
defendant must disprove reliance.17
Utilizing this presumption as a sign that the Court would
permit recovery where the plaintiff is faced with the almost impossible burden of proving reliance on information not known to
him, the circuit courts have expanded the plaintiff's ability to
12. The Reliance Requirement, supra note 10, at 585, (citing Note, The Nature and
Scope of the Reliance Requirement in Private Actions under SEC Rule 10b-5, 24 CASB
W. RES. L. REV. 363, 367 (1973».
13. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
14. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), (reaffirming the Birnbaum rule that the plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller of securities to
have standing in a private 10b-5 action); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) (scienter must be alleged in a private action under 10b-5); Santa Fe Industries v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (fraud will not include overreaching by a controlling shareholder; it must involve actual deception); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter
required in actions brought by the SEC); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)
(no criminal liability absent an affirmative duty to disclose). See generally Note, Chiarella v. United States: The Supreme Court's Common Law Catch to Market Insider Liability Under 10b-5, 14 J. MAR. L. REv. 847 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Common Law
Catch).
16. 406 U.S. at 152-54 (1971). See also, Common Law Catch, supra note 15, at 85253.
17. Id.
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plead and prove the reliance element in a lOb-5 action. IS "Fraud
on the market" or reliance upon the "integrity of the market" is
one such expansion. I I Essentially, the reasoning is that the
plaintiff should be able to rely on the fact that the price of any
security which can be purchased or sold on the market has been
set without manipulation or artificial inflation, and, thus, rely
indirectly on the truth of the underlying representations of the
validity of the stock. 20
Because there is little in the way of legislative intent relating to the goals of lOb-5, the courts have discerned the underlying policies of the rules from legislative and judicial history.1l
One of the policies which has been identified is the protection of
investors in the market. Congress chose to implement this policy
by imposing a duty of honesty and fair dealing through the requirement of disclosure. III The Acts were not intended to create
a form of investor's insurance, however, since the plaintiff still
must prove causation. 28 Liability is qualified, for "it must be
kept in mind that the nation's welfare depends upon the mainte18. See cases cited note 2, supra.
19. Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906·07 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 429 U.S.
816 (1976).
20. Id.
21.
The purpose of the bill is to protect the investing public and
honest business.... The aim is to prevent further exploita·
tion ... of the public by the sale of unsound fraudulent and
worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place ade·
Quate and true information before the investor; to protect
honest enterprise, seeking capital by honest presentation,
against the competition afforded by dishonest securities of·
fered to the public through crooked promotion; to restore the
confidence of the prospective investor in his ability to select
sound securities; to bring into productive channels of industry
and development capital which has grown timid to the point
of hoarding; and to aid in providing employment and restoring
buying and consuming power.
United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775·76 (1979) (citing S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess., 1 (1933». See generally Common Law Catch, supra note 15.
22. Rule 10b·5 attempts to "Qualify the doctrine of caveat emptor by imposing stan·
dards of honesty and fair dealing." Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 336 (1967). In Santa
Fe Indus. u. Green, the Supreme Court noted that it had repeatedly "described the 'fundamental purpose' of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as implementing a 'philosophy
of full disclosure'; once full and fair disclosure has ocurred, the fairness of the terms of
the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." 430 U.S. 462, 477.78
(1977).
23. List v. Fashion Park, 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2nd Cir. 1965).
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nance of a viable, vigorous business community."" Acknowledging the conflict in the legislative scheme between investor protection and the survival of the business community, the courts
have sought a balance by constructing workable limitations to
liability under rule lOb-5/11i requiring something more than that
"someone simply do something bad in connection with a
purchase or sale of securities."IG
One of the traditional limitations to a defendant's liability
has been the requirement that the plaintiff prove reliance on the
defendant's misrepresentations or, in the case of an omission,
that the facts withheld were material to his investment decision.
Developing the Reliance Requirement

In List v. Fashion Park,17 a suit which arose because of an
insider's nondisclosure when purchasing a minority shareholder's stock, the Second Circuit analyzed the test for reliance
in common law terms: "IT)he test of 'reliance' is whether 'the
misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the
course of conduct which results in [the recipient's) loss.' "16 The
court imposed a requirement that the plaintiff prove the defendant's .fraudulent conduct actually caused the injury.
The Supreme Court first attempted to define the elements
of a lOb-5 cause of action in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States. It In Ute, there was no proof of reliance upon defendant's
24. Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 91 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1970)).
25. [d.
26. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 961 (2d ed. 1968).
27. 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975). The plaintiff in List was an experienced investor
who sold his shares of Fashion Park stock upon the advice of his broker. The broker
knew that two of the directors of Fashion Park were at that time bidding upon the stock,
but did not consider it important enough to disclose to the plaintiff. The directors purchased plaintiff's stock. A merger was announced approximately three weeks later, offering $50 a share to all minority shareholders; the plaintiff had sold his shares for $18.50
each. Plaintiff alleged that the defendants conspired to purchase his stock by not disclosing their status as directors, which would have been a fact pertinent to his decision. The
court found that the plaintiff would have negotiated the sale even if he had known that
the purchasers were directors of the corporation.
28. [d. at 462.
29. 406 U.S. 128 (1971). Affiliated Ute involved a suit by members of an Indian
tribe against bank employees who had arranged sales of the tribal members' stock. The
stock represented a distribution of the tribe's assets: cash, oil, land, gas and mineral
rights, and unadjudicated and unliquidated claims against the government. The employ-
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fraudulent conduct because the conduct principally had been silence when there was a duty to disclose. so Finding that while reliance was necessary to establish causation, reliance upon an
omission would be almost impossible to· prove. The Court held:
Under the circumstances of this case, involving
primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is
necessary is that the facts withheld be material in
the sense that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important in the making of this
decision . . . . This obligation to disclose and
this withholding of a material fact establish the
requisite element of causation. II

In Ute the Court eased the plaintiff's burden, but it did not
eliminate the causation requirement of reliance. Instead, it recognized that reliance should be presumed when there has been a
material deception through omission.
After Ute, the Second Circuit discussed the two components
of causation which are necessary to establish causation-in-fact in
a fraudulent securities transaction.I I Where the defendant's action principally concerned misrepresentation, the plaintiff must
show both "loss causation-that the misrepresentation or omissions caused the economic harm-and transaction causation-that the violations in question caused the appellant to engage in the transaction in question."" While loss causation is
relatively easy to show, proof of transaction causation requires
the plaintiff to prove reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations. However, because of the Ute presumption, in an omissions
case the plaintiff need not prove reliance to establish transaction
causation. She must show instead that the facts in question were
ees received various commissions for their market-making activity, yet at no time revealed to the tribe that they were gaining financially from the sales, or that the shares
were selling at a higher price than the members were receiving.
30. rd. at 153.
31. rd. at 153-54.
32. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir. 1974). This division
of causation, requiring two forms of proof, has been pursued by both commentators and
other circuits. See Continental Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409 (8th Cir.
1979); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977);
Issen v. GSC Enterprises, 522 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1981). See 01&0 A. BROMBERG, SECURmES FRAUD-SEC RULE 10b-5, at § 8.7(1), at 215-16 (1967); Crane, An Analysis 01
Causation Under Rule lOb-5, 9 SEC. REG. L.J. 99 (1981).
33. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Co., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2nd Cir. 1974).
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"material in the sense that a reasonable investigator [sic] might
have considered them important."84
In its decision in Chiarella v. United States,as the Supreme
Court again referred to reliance as an element of a lOb-5 action.
As long as an affirmative duty to disclose is placed on the defendant, any breach of that duty and reliance by the plaintiff upon
the breach will give rise to liability:
Thus, administrative and judicial interpretations
have established that silence in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a
fraud actionable under section lOb despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history
specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure. But such liability is premised upon a duty to
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction."

Chiarella notably requires the existence of a duty between
the parties to the transaction. The Court refused to impose a
general duty upon all participants in market transactions, requiring only some recognized relationship which caused the defendant's silence to become intentionally misleading. a,

Since Ute, there has been a disagreement among the circuits
as to when the presumption of reliance should be invoked. The
critical distinction is between misrepresentation and omission. aa
When there has been primarily affirmative misrepresentation,
proof of reliance is required; when there has been primarily
34. 1d. at 380 (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United Statea, 406 U.S. at 152-53
(1971)).

35.- 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
36. 1d. at 230.

[T]he element required to make silence fraudulent-a duty to
disclose-is absent in this case .... We cannot affirm petitioner's conviction without recognizing a general duty between
all participants in market transactions to forgo [sic] actions
based on material, non public information. Formulation of
such a broad duty, which departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties. . . , should not be undertaken absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent.
1d. at 232-33.
38. See cases cited note 2, supra. See also Crane, supra note 32, at 102-03; The
Reliance Requirement, supra note lO, at 588-89.
37.
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omission or manipulation, reliance is presumed from materiality.
Protecting the Integrity of the Market

In Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co.,8e the Supreme Court first defined the causal link of

lOb-5. The Court found that Congress had attempted to bar any
fraud used "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.· O The Court read lOb-5 as a means of insuring that deceptive and manipulative devices would not be used either in faceto-face transactions or organized markets:41
[Section lOb] is not "limited to preserving the in·
tregity of the securities markets" ... , though
that purpose is included. Section lOb must be
read flexibly, not technically and restrictively.
Since there was a "sale" of a security and since
fraud was used "in connection with" it, there is
redress under §lOb. . . ."

While the reliance by· a plaintiff on a particular misstatement or omission might be relatively easy to prove or disprove in
a face-to-face transaction, an open market transaction poses a
far more difficult problem. The Ninth Circuit dealt with this
problem when it developed a doctrine designed as an extension
of the Ute presumption of reliance.
This doctrine of "fraud on the market" was first articulated
in Blackie v. Barrack. u In that case, the plaintiff sought to certify a large class of shareholders who had invested over a substantial period of time. The plaintiffs asserted reliance on the
inflated prices of the stock, which were the result of the defendant's alleged misrepresentations of the financial integrity of the
corporation. The court found that while reliance is necessary to
demonstrate the causal connection between the defendant's
wrongdoing and the plaintiffs' harm, causation could be established adequately by proof of purchase and the materiality of
the misrepresentation without any direct proof of reliance.·· The
court explained:
39. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
40. ld. at 12·13.
41. ld. at 12.

42.ld.
43. 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
44. ld. at 906.
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Materiality circumstantially establishes the reliance of some market traders and hence the inflation in the stock price-when the purchase is
made, the causational chain between defendant's
conduct and plaintiff's loss is sufficiently established to make out a prima facie case.
A purchaser on the stock exchanges . . . relies
generally on the supposition that the market price
is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the representations underlying the stock price. . . .411

The Blackie court reasoned that individual "transaction
causation"46 could be inferred from materiality in an open market transaction; and shifted the burden of disproving the prima
facie case to the defendant. 47 The Ninth Circuit found that the
defendant could disprove such a presumption in at least two
ways: "(1) by disproving materiality or by proving that, despite
materiality, an insufficient number of traders relied to inflate
the price; and (2) by proving that an individual plaintiff purchased despite knowledge of the falsity of the representation, or
that he would have, had he known of it. "48
The court wrote of reliance as an alternative method of establishing causation. In its view, causation could be established
by materiality as well as reliance; the concepts are not necessarily concomitant. 49 Reliance, however, is not eliminated, for it
begins to playa more important role for the defense. The defendant must now argue that in spite of the alleged materiality of
the fraud, the plaintif in fact did not rely on any of the representations, or that an insufficient number of other traders relied
on the fraud to actually have any effect on the price.
The reasoning of Blackie was recently adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in Shores v. Sklar'° and the Second Circuit in Panzirer
45. Id. at 907.
46. This means that the violation caused the plaintiff to engage in the transaction
and is to be distinguished from "1088 causation." See text accompanying note 33, supra.
47. 524 F.2d at 906 (9th Cir. 1975).
48.Id.
49. Id. at 906-07 n.22.
50. 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Wolf."1 In Panzirer, the plaintiff asserted the "fraud on the
market" theory after she purchased stock based on a report she
had read in the Wall Street Journal. While she alleged material
misrepresentations and omissions in the defendant corporation's
annual report, she had never actually seen that document. She
argued that, had the annual report been accurate, the Wall
Street Journal would never have issued a favorable article and
she would not have made the purchase. r.a The court agreed and
reasoned that just as material misrepresentations and omissions
will be presumed to affect the price of securities, so they should
be presumed to affect the information in the "heard on the
street" column:"8 "Where the plaintiff acts upon information
from those working in or reporting on the securities markets,
and where that information is circulated after a material misrepresentation or omission, the plaintiff has stated a sufficient claim
of reliance on the misrepresentation or omission."&4
V.

The Shores court also applied the reasoning of Blackie,
finding that the plaintiff need not rely specifically on material
misrepresentations and omissions relating to any single disclosure document. If the plaintiff can prove that the existence of
the security on the market resulted in a perpetration of fraud
upon the investment community, and the security was purchased in reliance on the validity of the market, the plaintiff will
be given an opportunity to recover.&11
In Shores, the alleged fraud dealt with an issue of municipal
revenue bonds. These bonds were issued after a financing
scheme was formulated based on several allegedly fraudulent
misrepresentations and omissions."8 In this case, as in Panzirer,
the plaintiff had never seen the offering circUlar which he
claimed was fraudulent. He based his purchasing decision on his
51. 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981).
52. Jd. at 366·67.
53. Jd.
54. Jd. at 367.

55. 647 F.2d at 464 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Essentially, the defendants in this case had engaged in a scheme to persuade the
municipality of Frisco City, Alabama to incorporate an industrial development board.
The defendants represented themselves as being experienced developers, financially secure and owning sufficient assets to cover a bond issue should it be declared in default.
The board issued bonds based upon these representations. The defendants were unable
to make any payments, which were necessary to amortize the bonds, and the bonds were
subsequently declared to be in default. Jd. at 464-67.
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broker's representations, which in turn were based on market
information. 1I7
Shores is perhaps the most interesting of the Blackie progeny, for the majority and the dissent in their separate opinions
develop two distinct arguments relating to the application of reliance in a lOb-5 action. The majority, while noting that the
plaintiff's admitted nonreliance upon the offering circular would
defeat his lOb-5 claim based on material misrepresentations or
omissionslls found that the allegation of a more pervasive scheme
to defraud and fraudulent course of business would not fail due
to lack of reliance on the circular. They reasoned that if those
securities were placed on the market due to fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions, and the plaintiff had relied on the integrity of the market to establish their validity, then adequate
causation-in-fact had been established. liB Thus, the presence of
the securities in the market was material "in the sense that a
reasonable investor might have considered [those facts] important in making his investment decisions. "60

The majority analyzed the plaintiff's allegations in light of
what they considered to be the principal purposes of the Securities Acts. While they perceived disclosure as a means to insure
57. [d. at 467.
58. The court referred to this as a 10b-5(2) claim. For applicable statutory language,
see note 9 supra.
59. The Shores court noted that misrepresentation actions brought under rule 10b5(2) may require a different showing of transaction causation than those actions attempting to show a scheme or course of business intended to defraud. The court observed that doing away with the requirement that the misrepresentation be a substantial
factor in determining the course of conduct which results in the loss, in a conventional
10b-5(2) case, could establish a form of investor's insurance. 647 F.2d at 469 n.5. The
court also outlined the necessary elements of an action under 10b-5(1) and (3). The
plaintiff's burden of proof will be to show:
(1) defendants knowingly conspired to bring securities onto
the market which were not entitled to be marketed, intending
to defraud purchasers, (2) plaintiff reasonably relied on the securities' availability on the market as an indication of their
apparent genuineness, and (3) as a result of the scheme to defraud, plaintiff suffered a loss.
[d. at 469-70.
60. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. at 153-54. The Shores court
relied on the reasoning of Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2nd Cir.
1974), for establishing transaction causation through materiality in a case where a fraud
had been perpetrated through an omission. 647 F.2d at 419. See also text accompanying
note 33, supra.
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investor protection, in their view that was not the ultimate
goal. S1 They found that in this factual situation, where the plaintiff alleges a pervasive scheme to defraud, the Acts allow a plaintiff to rely "on the integrity of the market to the extent that the
securities it offers to him for purchase are entitled to be in the
market place."62
The majority separated 10b-5 into two district causes of action, finding support for actions in the language of the rule itself. sa They reasoned that when the focus of the fraud shifts
from a particular document to a more pervasive fraud, the
search for causation must also shift and the plaintiff need not
rely on any specific document. 84
The dissent in Shores believed that the majority's theory of
investor protection defeated the equally important goal of making informed investment decisions. eo The dissent reasoned that
by distinguishing between those securities which were initially
entitled to be marketed (and later become the object of some
fraud), and those which, absent fraud, would never have been
marketed, the plaintiffs burden of proof of reliance and recovery would turn on what kind of security was purchased." They
noted that Blackie, while allowing reliance on the integrity of
the market to establish causation, also allowed that presumption
to be overcome if the defendant could show a lack of reliance.I '
The dissent perceived full and fair disclosure as a primary
objective of the Securities Acts, disagreeing with what the majority saw as the central role of rule 10b-5.la In contrast to the
consumer-oriented legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, the "federal securities laws are based on the premise that the federal
government's role is merely to ensure the free flow of complete
and accurate information within the Nation's securities mar61. 647 F.2d at 470.
62. Id. at 471.
63.Id.

64. "The reliance that produces causation in the [case of a more pervasive fraud)
cannot come from reading a document." Id. at 472.
65. Id. at 473.
66.Id.
67. Id. at 478-79.
68. Id. at 481.
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kets."69 Once that disclosure had been accomplished, the investor should be expected to protect himself; the "fairness of the
terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the
statute. "70
The dissent's position was that the goal of the Securities
Acts, a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry, would be furthered by precluding recovery to a plaintiff who
had made an investment decision without reference to the information promulgated under the disclosure requirements. "In
short, the federal securities laws are intended to put investors
into a position from which they can help themselves by relying
upon disclosures that others are obligated to make. This system
is not furthered by allowing monetary recovery to those who refuse to look out for themselves.,m
III. DISCUSSION
Because of the virtually unlimited language of rule lOb-5
and its judicially created cause of action, the duty of limiting the
applicability of the rule has fallen to the courts.7lI This has been
accomplished by requiring various elements of tort liability to
establish causation. First required in List, as one of the traditional elements of common law fraud, reliance by the plaintiff on
the defendant's action or inaction has been one of those necessary elements of proof.
Whenever there is any proposed expansion of the lOb-5
cause of action, the courts must evaluate the expansion in light
of increased litigation or any interference with relevant state
law, as well as considering whether such an extension will fulfill
the legislative purposes of the Securities Acts." The circuits
have attempted to find equitable solutions where plaintiffs have
69. [d. at 482.
70. [d. at 482 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977).
71. [d. at 483. Surveying Supreme Court decisions, the dissent noted a consistent
refusal to eliminate any of the basic elements of a 10b-5 action, and that reliance was
one of those long standing requirements. [d. at 484 (citing Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680
(1980); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 723 (1973».
72. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1973), the Court
wrote of the unanticipated growth of the 10b-5 actions, and the Court's duty to delineate
what was a "judicially created cause of action.
73. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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been victims of defendants' wrongdoing. The Shores majority
noted that doing away with proof of reliance where there are
material misstatements or omissions would essentially institute
a system of investor's insurance, counter to what the legislature
had intended in the Securities Acts. 7• But the court has given
investors an opportunity to avoid the requirement of reliance by
alleging fraud on a broader scale.
Theoretically, the burden which is now placed on the defendant is no more exacting than that which was previously placed
on the plaintiff to prove reliance. The Blackie court provided at
least two ways for the defendant to meet this burden.711 Practically, however, this theory of the integrity of the market and reliance on that integrity to produce valid securities almost seems
to eliminate a defendant's means of disproving reliance and lead
to far greater liability. Unless the defendant can prove that the
plaintiff is a totally unreasonable investor-purchasing without
regard to market knowledge-or that the fraud involved would
not have any material effect on the price or information regarding the securities (two situations which are difficult to imagine in
a financial world of easily influenced and quickly fluctuating
stock prices), then the presumption will be that the defendant is
responsible for the plaintiff's loss. The notion that without researching any of the disclosure documents made available, a
purchaser can simply presume that anything on the market is
valid seems to be a considerable step in the direction of insured
investments.
Looking at the legislative scheme, the Securities Acts were
set up as disclosure statutes, not only demanding full disclosure
of issurers, brokers, dealers, and underwriters, but also obligating the investor to some form of diligence. 78 As one commentator
observed: "Two significant policy considerations behind the Securities Acts are providing full access to relevant information
and market stability. Market stability may be threatened as
much by investor carelessness as it is by manipulations, and full
access is useless if investors are not encouraged to take advantage of that access. "77
74. 647 F.2d at 469 n.5 (5th Cir. 1981).
75. See text accompanying note 48, supra.
76. Crane, supra note 32, at 111.
77. Id.
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In a fraudulent securities scheme, however, a plaintiff
should also be given an opportunity to recover from a defendant's willful manipulation and wrongdoing. The rule was enacted to protect investors as well,n and by allowing a presumption of reliance to assist the plaintiff through the stage of
summary judgment, he will be afforded an opportunity to prove
a scheme which may perpetrate fraud on the entire investment
community. Perhaps the view of the Blackie courtthat "reliance
as a separate requirement is simply a milepost on the road to
causation"T' is correct. Possibly reliance should not be demanded of a plaintiff to prove causation, but should be only one
of the possible elements which would prove that defendant's
wrongdoing resulted in plaintiff's harm.
IV. CONCLUSION
Central to the determination of the applicability of the
fraud on the market theory is an ascertainment of the goals of
the Securities Acts. If the Acts were designed to promote market
stability, then informed decisions by investors are called for and
allowing reliance on the general integrity of the market does not
promote that goal. If instead the aim is investor protection, then
clearly the fraud on the market theory advances that protection.
The policy of the courts has been to cut off defendant's liability at the point where there is no reliance by the plaintiff on
the defendant's misrepresentations or omissions. Allowing reliance on the integrity of the market, however, expands a plaintiff's opportunity for recovery when there is no reliance on those
specific misstatements or omissions, but merely a belief that anything which can be purchased on the market has been placed
there without fraud.
While the validity of this doctrine remains to be tested in
the Supreme Court, there is disagreement among the judges on
the individual courts and among the different circuits as to what
degree of reliance is necessary to establish causation. While investors do have a duty to make informed decisions, obviously a
fraudulent security should not be permitted to remain on the
market, and the harm which results from its issue and trading
78. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 3, at § 6.
79. 524 F.2d at 906 n.22 (9th Cir. 1975).
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should be compensated. Recently, in Chiarella, in keeping with
its recent contraction of lOb-5 liability, the Supreme Court refused to formulate a broader duty when asked to expand liability beyond its traditional scope. 80 Adoption of a fraud on the
market theory would certainly increase the liability of potential
defendants beyond the traditional limitations established requiring proof of reliance. If the Court is faced with this doctrine
while continuing its present course, it most likely would refuse
to find liability for harm which results from a plaintiff's reliance
on only the integrity of the market to establish valid securities.
Because the securities regulations require disclosure, a decision
of the Court not to allow proof of the element of reliance in this
manner would be in accordance with those requirements. But,
investors who are not aware of the levels of financial sophistication and the areas open to deception within the investing world
would still be without a remedy for fraud on the market. Perhaps what is called for is not a new application of lOb-5, but a
new anti-fraud statute which would insure that such harms do
not go without redress.
M. Lynn Haggerty

SO. 445 U.S. at 233 (1981). But in John Nuveen & Co. v. Sanders, (1981 Transfer
binder] FED. SEC. L. RPl'R. (CCH) 'II 97,900, a dissent to a per curiam opinion indicated
that the court might be willing to expand another of the antifraud provisions-§ 12(2) of
the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976)-by imposing a higher standard of reasonable
investigation on underwriters when they examine an issuer's financial statement before
release. (ld. Powell and Rehnquist, J.J., dissenting). Should the prospectus be released
with the misrepresentation, the underwriter could be held liable as well as the issuer. See
Symposium-Securities Law, 30 EMORY L.J. I, 6 (1981). See also Steadman v. SEC, 450
U.S. 91 (1981), allowing the SEC to prove a violation of antifraud provision § 17(a) of the
1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. 77q(a) (1976), by the standard of a preponderance of evidence, regardless of later possibly severe sanctions based on the same judgement.
While the court is refusing to expand the application of IOb-5 liability, in other
areas of antifraud perhaps it is not so predisposed.
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